This paper looks at the effects of different forms of wholesale and retail regulation on retail competition in fixed network telephony markets. We explicitly model two asymmetries between the incumbent operator and a group of homogenous entrants: (i) while the incumbent has zero marginal costs, the entrant has the wholesale access charge as (positive) marginal costs; (ii) while the incumbent sets a two-part tariff at the retail level (fixed fee and calls price), the entrant can only set a linear price for calls. We model the product of the incumbent as horizontally differentiated from the products of the entrants, who are homogenous and do not have any market power. Competition from other infrastructures such as mobile telephony or cable is modelled as an "outside opportunity" for consumers. We find that entrants without market power might be subject to a margin squeeze if the wholesale access price is set at average costs and competitive pressure from other infrastructures increases. We argue that wholesale price regulation at average costs is not optimal in such a situation and discuss other forms of cost-based regulation, retail-minus and deregulation as potential alternatives.
Introduction
In the late 1990s, competition was introduced in European fixed network voice telephony markets by allowing new entrants to get access to the incumbent's network. At the beginning of fixed network liberalization, the main concern of regulators was to bring down retail prices from their (perceived) excessive levels. As call prices of the incumbent fell significantly after the introduction of wholesale access regulation, the focus of regulation shifted: Currently, a main concern of national regulatory authorities (NRAs) is that the incumbent mightabsent regulation -set the price of call services so low that an equally efficient entrant in the downstream segment could not survive given the regulated wholesale access charge. Such price setting by the incumbent operator is called margin squeeze or price squeeze.
Landline-based call services offered by alternative operators buying essential wholesale inputs (origination and termination) from the incumbent are still widely used today (for the EU see European Commission, 2009a, Annex 2, Figure 44a ). Although granting wholesale access is implemented differently in international comparison, consumers basically subscribe to the incumbent's network and then can choose to make their calls via the incumbent or the entrant. In the US, landline-based long-distance services are offered in such a manner. In the EU, this choice is due to carrier selection (CS) and carrier pre-selection (CPS) obligations imposed on the incumbent firm. In turn, direct access competition stemming from infrastructure-based cable or unbundling (ULL) operators ('intramodal') is still rather limited and the average European incumbent firm holds by far the highest market share.
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In contrast, competitive pressure from mobile telephony ('intermodal') has increased significantly over the past years. 2 Our paper examines in detail the incentives and equilibrium outcomes in a scenario where the potentially regulated incumbent faces such service-based (CS/CPS) competition. Given this focus, infrastructure-based competition -either intramodal from within the wireline sector or intermodal from wireless telephony -enters our model exogenously as an important outside opportunity for consumers. Therefore, we abstract from the potential strategic interactions between the different market segments (mobile vs. wireline). This allows us to take into account in a simple but very intuitive way the relevant competitive developments in these segments without having to deal simultaneously with complicated strategic interactions between a large number of potential players.
While one could and should model these interactions, this is beyond the scope of our present paper. We use our framework to examine i) the conditions under which entrants might be subject to a margin squeeze, and ii) the implications and effects of various regulatory options such as wholesale access regulation at costoriented prices or retail-minus and retail regulation of the fixed fee.
We employ a differentiated product Bertrand oligopoly model, which distinguishes between the incumbent on one hand and several entrants supplying a homogeneous product on the other hand. With this specification the incumbent enjoys market power, but the entrants do not. We consider this as a rather realistic scenario on fixed voice telephony markets, where incumbents (still) benefit from diverse incumbency advantages stemming from, e.g., brand or product loyalty, good reputation, consumer inertia or uncertainty about the quality of new entrants. Price competition among CS and CPS providers on the other hand has become particularly intense 3 and has considerably reduced the market power of the entrants. As a consequence, there is no role for double marginalization in the model.
Our model differs from previous models as we simultaneously take into account two characteristic market features: First, we model a potential difference in (perceived) marginal cost between the incumbent and the entrant. While the incumbent is assumed to have zero marginal costs per minute, the entrant has the wholesale access charge as (potentially) positive and substantial marginal costs. We call this asymmetry between incumbent and entrant the 'vertical asymmetry'. Second, the incumbent can set a two-part tariff at the retail level (a fixed fee and a price per minute), while the entrant can only set a linear price per minute. Although CS/CPS operators could also set two-part tariffs (where the user then pays a fixed fee in addition to the incumbent's fixed fee) in principle, empirical evidence shows that customers are reluctant to accept such an 'extra' fixed fee. This comes along with an increase in consumers' demand for 'one-stop-shopping' solutions.
confronted with positive marginal costs, it may not be possible for them to offer unlimited calling plans (or bundles which include large call volumes).
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This paper provides a generalized version of the much simpler and policyorientated presentation in , who solely focus on the homogenous product case. Apart from Briglauer et al. -as far as we are awarethe horizontal and the vertical asymmetry have not yet been simultaneously applied in a single model. The seminal telecom-models of Armstrong (2002) and Laffont et al. (1998a and 1998b) either consider one-way access where the incumbent and the alternative operator are setting linear prices at the retail level or consider competition (and interconnection) between two operators which can both set one-or two-part tariffs at the retail level. Also, in the literature on nonprice discrimination ('sabotage', 'raising rival´s costs'; see Economides, 1998; Sibley and Weisman, 1998; Beard et al., 2001; Weisman, 2003; Mandy and Sappington, 2007 ) the incumbent and entrant compete in linear prices at the retail level. We show that the extent to which the incumbent is able to extract consumer surplus via a fixed fee is decisive for retail per-minute prices and for the terms at which the incumbent is willing to provide access. Biglaiser and DeGraba (2001) also consider a model where the incumbent operator has wholesale costs of zero but sells access at a positive price. Both firms can set two-part tariffs at the retail level, however. Gans and King (2005) investigate the 'competitive neutrality' of access charges and model the 'vertical asymmetry'. They find that upstream prices that differ from marginal costs are not competitively neutral in the sense of placing integrated and non-integrated firms on an equal basis. They do not allow the incumbent to set two-part tariffs, though. Davis and Murphy (2001) analyse competition between a firm offering two complementary goods and a firm offering only one of the two goods, which is a setting close to 'horizontal asymmetry' but without two-part tariffs. Peitz (2005) examines the effect of asymmetric access regulation on market entry and consumer surplus. Peitz formalizes a market where incumbent and infrastructure-based entrants compete in two-part tariffs with identical cost structures. Höffler and Schmidt (2008) examine the welfare effects of resellers who compete downstream with several vertically integrated firms. Höffler and Schmidt employ a model with horizontal product differentiation but with competition in linear retail prices. Other related papers are Sarmento and Brandao (2007) and Kotakorpi (2006) , which focus on effects of vertical integration and access regulation on foreclosure and investments. Both use linear pricing at the retail level.
The rest of the article is structured as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model. Section 3 contrasts the benchmark case of an unregulated incumbent with various regulatory options. We examine the most commonly employed instruments of cost-oriented prices and retail-minus regulation. We also consider the effects of increased competition from outside opportunities and from product differentiation. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the main conclusions.
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The model
In this section we present the model where a vertically integrated operator (the incumbent operator I) competes with n entrant firms. The entrants buy access at a price t per minute from the incumbent operator. Since the entrants basically resell the same service (provided by the incumbent), we assume that consumers do not view their products as differentiated. Since we assume Bertrand price-competition, an immediate consequence is that the price of the entrants will always be equal to the access charge t plus possible retail costs. Without loss of generality we assume that all these retail costs are zero. Therefore, it holds that entrants charge a single per-minute price p E with p E = t. As entrants do not exert market power, double marginalization is not an issue in our model. Like in Armstrong (2002) , our entrants can be called a competitive fringe.
At the retail level, the incumbent operator sets a two-part tariff with a fixed fee f (line rental) and a per-minute charge of p I . Consumers subscribe to the incumbent and pay the fixed fee f and then can decide whether they use the incumbent or the entrants for their calls. We model the product of the incumbent as horizontally differentiated from the products the entrants offer. While the entrants do not enjoy market power due to selling the same product as the fellow entrant, the incumbent has market power and can set a price different from that of the entrant and nevertheless commands a positive market share.
Formally, we assume a representative consumer with preferences according to the following quasi-linear utility function of:
where y is the numeraire good, U O is the utility consumers obtain from the outside opportunity, and x I denotes the retail demand for calls operated directly by the incumbent. x E = x E,1 + x E,2 + … + x E,n is the aggregate number of call minutes operated by all active entrants. The utility function makes clear that consumers either use the incumbent's network or the outside opportunity. Utility from landline-based services is determined by the parameters a and s. The differentiation parameter s is between 0 and 1, with 0 indicating independent demand and 1 indicating that consumers consider the entrants' products to be perfect substitutes for the product of the incumbent. Put simply, s determines the pricing power of the incumbent's retail subsidiary compared to the entrants. The parameter a determines, loosely speaking, the maximum willingness to pay for calls.
We assume that the number of consumers is of measure one, and that all consumers are actually identical. When introducing a fixed fee to extract consumer surplus, we will further discuss this assumption.
The above assumptions on the utility function and the number of consumers yield the following linear retail demand x I for calls operated by the incumbent:
With the quasi-linear utility function, consumer surplus is given by (monetary) utility minus total expenses. Consumer surplus CS reads
in the case consumers buy landline services. Total income Y is equal to total expenditure from the budget constraint and f is the fixed fee (line rental). In formal terms, the latter means that
. Consumers will choose to buy access from the incumbent only if CS  CS O , where CS O is consumer surplus from the outside opportunity, which is defined analogously to CS, taking into account the expenditure on the outside opportunity.
As mentioned in the introduction, CS O provides a simple way to account for infrastructure-based competition from either intramodal or intermodal services. Note that consumers choose either the outside good provided by the alternative suppliers, the incumbent's product or CS/CPS services provided by the servicebased entrants. We will assume that the incumbent takes the utility provided by the outside opportunities as given. Therefore, we abstract from the potential strategic interactions between the different market segments (e.g. mobile vs. wireline).
The profit of the incumbent reads (4)
and consists of revenue from the fixed fee, the calls sold by the retail unit as well as wholesale income from selling access at a price t to entrants. As noted above, all other variable costs are assumed to be equal to zero. 6 As regards fixed costs, we assume that service-based entry does not require fixed investments so that entrants do not face fixed costs on the retail or wholesale levels. Therefore, simple Bertrand pricing applies and the profit of each entrant is zero.
Equilibrium outcomes under various regulatory regimes
We now turn to the derivation of the equilibrium of the model. Due to the simple setup with homogenous entrants, which do not have market power, the unregulated benchmark case as well as the cases with either regulation of only the wholesale access charge or with retail regulation of only the fixed fee is straightforward. We discuss these cases briefly and then turn to the most relevant case in practice, the combination of retail and wholesale regulation.
Benchmark case
As noted above, introducing a group of entrants offering a homogeneous product leads to pricing at marginal costs for the entrants, i.e., for each entrant we have p E = t. There is no double marginalization problem in this case, and the incumbent will simply set the access charge equal to marginal costs, i.e., t = 0. This maximizes consumer surplus, which the incumbent extracts via the unregulated fixed fee f
The fixed fee decreases in the product differentiation parameter s; the more homogenous products are, the lower is consumer surplus which can be extracted by the incumbent. These results are an instance of the 'Chicago Critique' of foreclosure, according to which there is only one profit which the incumbent can fully skim by the fixed fee. If potential entrants are equally efficient retail outlets and if they do not have market power, the incumbent is strictly better off to provide access as long as s < 1, i.e., if there is a 'love of variety ' effect. 7 The welfare properties of the equilibrium are straightforward. Since prices are equal to marginal costs, we are in a first-best solution. Total welfare is at a maximum and consumer surplus is equal to the consumer surplus provided by the outside opportunity.
As for the benchmark case, turning to the case where only the wholesale access charge t is regulated, the result is obvious. Since the unregulated access charge is equal to marginal cost, there is nothing to gain in terms of welfare or of consumer surplus with such a policy.
Retail regulation of the fixed fee f
So far, we considered cases where the incumbent charged retail prices rather close to marginal costs, as he could extract consumer surplus directly by means of a fixed fee. In the next step, we examine the changes resulting from putting constraints on this instrument. In contrast to the outside opportunity, such constraints render extraction of all consumer surplus (above CS O ) impossible. In most countries regulators set upper bounds on the retail fixed fee (f R ), motivated by universal service considerations or firm-specific market power. is sufficiently small, the incumbent maximizes profits by choosing the optimal linear price p I . Taking into account that p E = t, profit maximization with respect to p I yields the reaction function, which is also the equilibrium price of the third stage.
Substituting this result into the profit function and solving for the equilibrium of the second stage of the game, we obtain the access charge t determined by the incumbent as
The result is therefore simple and straightforward. Bertrand competition among entrants leads to p E = t and the incumbent sets t as well as p I equal to the monopoly price a/2. By setting t equal to this value, the monopolist is able to extract all profit possible with linear prices.
Note that the above reasoning applies only if either f R or the utility from the outside good, and therefore CS O , is rather low. It is assumed that there is not much substitution away from fixed line telephony even if monopoly prices are charged for this service. Given that there are serious arguments for considering mobile telephony as an increasingly better substitute for wireline services, we expect that the incumbent is subject to stronger constraints. 
The boundary cases of the domain lead to the monopoly price and to a price equal to marginal cost, respectively. The explanation of this result is straightforward. The incumbent sets prices sufficiently low so that he can extract as much consumer surplus by means of the fixed fee as possible and that consumers still buy the product. Given the constraint to provide sufficient consumer surplus, the incumbent sets the prices as high as possible since we are in the range below the monopoly prices.
The result in equation (8) shows that there is no margin squeeze; the incumbent offers access at retail-minus. 9 Furthermore, prices decrease if utility from the outside opportunity increases. Via this channel, intermodal competition has a direct effect on call prices. Furthermore, the relation between f R and equilibrium prices and the access charge, is an inverse one. If the incumbent is allowed to charge a higher fixed fee, he will decrease call prices.
At this stage we want to comment briefly on our assumption of identical consumers. Heterogeneity among consumers could, for instance, be introduced by assuming different values of the maximum willingness to pay for different consumers, i.e., by assuming different values of the parameter a in the utility function stated in equation (1). As long as the incumbent serves all consumers, the optimal two-part tariff involves prices above marginal costs and a fixed fee equal to the consumer surplus of the types with a low willingness to pay (minus CS O ).
9 Retail-minus is a simplified version of the 'Efficient Component Pricing Rule' (ECPR), which can be expressed as t rm = t + σ [p I -(c I + t)]
where the access price (t rm ) depends on the incumbent's retail price, the marginal costs of providing access (t), the marginal retail costs (c I ) and the displacement ratio σ, which measures how many units of incumbents´ retail service are lost by supplying a unit of access to its rivals (see for example Armstrong et al., 1996) . With σ = 1 the ECPR simplifies to t rm = p I -c I , which has been called retail-minus.
Thus, we obtain a similar result to the one with regulation of the fixed fee. Again, an increase in the utility from the outside opportunity implies a fall in call charges.
Regulation of the fixed fee f and the access charge t
In current EU regulatory practice, regulation of both the monthly fixed fee and the access charge is most common (see Cullen International, 2008) . Again, we need to distinguish between different, i.e., binding and non-binding, levels of f R . The wholesale access charge t is exogenously fixed by the regulator at a cost-oriented level, t CO , 11 or determined by a 'retail-minus' rule, i.e., t RM = p I (since retail costs are set to zero). In both cases, the entrants' price will be equal to the regulated access charge.
First, we consider (exogenously determined) cost-oriented access charges. For a low level of f R (Case 1) we know that the optimum linear prices apply. The incumbent's price derives from the respective reaction function (Equation (6) applies). We obtain:
Note that p I is always greater than t CO , as it is a weighted average of the monopoly price and the access charge t CO . Therefore, the incumbent's price is greater than that of the entrants and there is no margin squeeze.
Next 
If this condition applies, the incumbent will charge a (lower) price in order to guarantee f R . As soon as 11 Typically, cost-oriented prices are based on average costs of the incumbent's network which are significantly above marginal costs. For a further discussion on this assumption see Briglauer et al., p. 5 . Two-part access and capacity-based charges represent other forms of cost-oriented access prices which regulators might enforce. We briefly discuss these alternatives at the end of this section. Economics, Vol. 10 [2011 ], Iss. 4, Art. 3 DOI: 10.2202 /1446 -9022.1257 (11)
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the incumbent charges a price lower than the price of the entrants and also lower than the access charge t CO . Figure 1 depicts both, the case without regulation of the wholesale access charge and with a rate t CO regulated at average cost. The figure allows for a 'dynamic' interpretation of a development with increasing intermodal competition. Just fix f R at some small values (e.g. .1) and assume that CS O is 0 so that optimal linear prices apply (in the case without regulation of the wholesale access charge). Without wholesale regulation the incumbent's retail and wholesale prices are equal to the (linear) monopoly price of .5. Increasing intermodal competition leading to larger values of CS O eventually leads to a gradual decrease in the wholesale and retail prices to prices which can be as low as the marginal costs (which are de facto zero on a per minute basis). Finally, we may arrive at flat rates for fixed-line telephony. If we introduce cost-oriented wholesale regulation of the access charge at t CO = .2, prices are lower for low values of CS O than without wholesale regulation. Furthermore, there is no margin squeeze and the incumbent charges a higher retail
). This mirrors the situation after the introduction of wholesale regulation.
However, as intermodal competition increases to lead to values of f R + CS O greater than about .34, the incumbent reduces his retail price. Tougher intermodal competition eventually leads to a margin squeeze. This is an important result since it is a potential explanation for the observed shift of regulation from preventing excessive call prices to preventing calls prices that are 'too low', which may squeeze the entrants out of the market. In the region of the margin squeeze the incumbent charges a lower price than without wholesale regulation. This shift has happened within the last few years, when competition from other (in particular mobile) networks also increased significantly and the fixed fee also increased.
Turning to regulation according to the retail-minus rule, the access charges are determined from the incumbent's optimization problem. A comparison with section 3.2 shows that a retail-minus regulation simply replicates the case without wholesale regulation, i.e., the incumbent would voluntarily set the access price according to the retail-minus rule. Increases in either f Concluding this section, we briefly discuss two-part tariffs and capacitybased charges as alternative ways of determining the price for the wholesale product. The simplest way to do that would be a fixed charge per access line plus a per-minute charge. In our Bertrand setup with homogeneous consumers, this would induce all entrants to offer exactly this tariff as a retail offer. There would not be any difference to our above model apart from the fact that the incumbent receives part of the fixed fee via the wholesale product from the entrants rather than from final consumers.
Alternatively, the wholesale product might consist of a per-minute charge plus a fixed payment, which is independent of both the number of access lines and of call-minutes. To ensure the existence of an equilibrium in this case, we would have to invoke contestability among the entrants. If the single active entrant is able to charge a fixed fee, this setup will lead to a fixed fee per consumer plus a per-minute charge equal to the per-minute access charge.
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The aggregate fixed fee payments of consumers would cover the fixed costs and we would end up with the same prices as in the above case.
Finally, the regulator might consider capacity-based charges (CBC). CBC set the price equal to the incremental cost of the capacity, which is expressed as a fixed monthly fee -instead of per-minute prices -for a specific amount of interconnection bandwidth, e.g., a 2 Mbit/s leased line. Again, the interpretation of this case is straightforward in terms of our homogeneous consumer model. The entrants would offer a flat rate. The demand function gives the number of calls a single consumer demands for a per-minute price of 0. This quantity determines the number of consumers an entrant can serve with his capacity. The equilibrium retail fixed fee charged by an entrant per consumer is simply the capacity costs divided by the number of consumers which can be served given this capacity. 13 Again, the results do not differ from the first case considered above, apart from the per-minute access charge which has been assumed to be zero in this case. The general conclusion from the three cases is that the results of our basic model extend to a scenario in which we allow for two-part wholesale tariffs.
Summary and conclusions
We presented a model where two (or more) entrants buy an input from a vertically integrated incumbent and compete with the incumbent in prices at the retail level.
The model allowed us to investigate if or under which conditions the entrants are subject to a margin squeeze. The entrants have the wholesale access price as positive marginal costs while the incumbent has zero marginal costs. In addition, the incumbent can set a two-part tariff while the entrants can only set a linear retail price. This captures the main features of CS/CPS competition in fixed network voice telephony markets, where entrants typically enjoy no market power vis a vis the incumbent. In turn, the incumbent still has market power, which is due to diverse 'incumbency advantages'. Furthermore, we considered the effects from infrastructure-based competition (e.g. from mobile or cable networks or from ULL operators) by introducing an 'outside opportunity' for the consumer. Since the homogenous entrants do not have market power, there is no double marginalization and no margin squeeze in the unregulated case. A margin squeeze may still arise, however, if the access charge is regulated at (positive) average costs and the retail fixed fee is unregulated or regulated and sufficiently large. If the fixed fee is regulated and sufficiently small, the margin squeeze 13 CBC is conceptually related to two-part wholesale tariffs. Just like CBC, two-part tariffs allow for more efficient capacity utilization and retail pricing flexibility than linear (minute-based) access pricing. However, from the viewpoint of efficiency CBC strictly dominates two-part wholesale tariffs with a positive variable access component as it closely resembles the network's cost structures of zero marginal costs up to capacity. It is also easier to reconcile with the increasingly popular unlimited (flat-rate) calling plans or bundles which include huge call volumes (optional tariffs).
disappears. With the introduction of an outside opportunity, a dynamic interpretation of the model is possible: In a situation where the access price is regulated at average costs and the fixed fee is also regulated (and sufficiently small), an increase in the utility provided by the outside opportunity or an increase in the fixed fee will lower the retail call price of the incumbent below the access charge. Increased competition from outside opportunities may thus lead to a margin squeeze. This is an important result, since this might have happened in many countries over the past years. As pressure from other infrastructures -most notably, mobile telephony -became stronger and stronger, the focus of regulation in fixed network markets shifted from preventing excessive call prices to preventing a margin squeeze. Our model provides a reasonable explanation for this and shows that the margin squeeze might well be the result of increasing (intermodal) competition rather than of anticompetitive behaviour. In the model the incumbent would in a certain range voluntarily set an access charge below an average cost-oriented price. In such a situation a retail-minus access price wouldat least in theory -lead to lower retail prices than a cost-oriented access price. Indeed, regulators seem to increasingly consider retail-minus regulation as a kind of regulatory safeguard, 14 which guarantees that there is no margin squeeze and that the regulated incumbent firm gets necessary downward pricing flexibility in intermodal competition.
Interestingly, the observed problem could also be solved by interpreting the cost-oriented wholesale charge as a price cap. In our model, the incumbent would voluntarily lower the wholesale access price below this level if the value from the outside opportunity increased and a margin squeeze would occur. According to our knowledge, this is a new argument why regulators should formulate wholesale access price caps rather than fixed prices. One should be aware, however, that in practice NRAs will most likely continue to be reluctant to impose price caps as a safeguard against exclusionary behaviour. Such behaviour could arise for instance, as price caps typically comprise several services within a pre-defined wholesale basket. This in turn might induce strategic tariffrebalancing on behalf of the regulated firm. Also, from a dynamic point of view, 14 The retail-minus approach has received increasing regulatory attention in recent years. See for instance, the discussion within the Independent Regulators Group (IRG), which published principles of implementation and best practice regarding the use of retail-minus pricing (IRG, 2005) . Since then retail-minus has been applied by NRAs for diverse narrowband ('Wholesale Line Rental') and broadband ('bitstream', 'naked-DSL') access products. As regards academic literature see for instance Goncalves (2007) discussing the adequacy of retail-minus as an alternative to cost orientation in determining bitstream access charges or Sarmento and Brandao, who show that retail-minus regulation avoids a margin squeeze and leads to better results than cost-based regulation in terms of investment level and consumer surplus.
there may be other reasons for incumbent operators to expose their retail competitors to a margin squeeze (see for example Briglauer et al., pp. 557-558 or Croccioni, 2007) . Typically, price cap regulation has been subjected to some price floor controls when the regulated firm that supplies an essential wholesale input also competes at the retail level (Sappington, 2002, pp. 263-264) . This might explain why some NRAs have chosen to apply retail-minus instead of a price cap, in particular where retail competition is increasing and regulatory concerns are targeted towards margin squeeze control. In our model, however, the two methodologies yield the same result.
Strong pressure from outside opportunities of course puts into question the need for regulation in calls markets (including wholesale regulation and the CS/CPS business case) itself. Regulators therefore will have to closely examine whether (and for which markets) competitive pressure from mobile telephony or other networks is strong enough so that the regulation of fixed network voice telephony markets would no longer be necessary at all or could be at least partially reduced. Currently, it seems that (European) policy makers and regulators do not consider intermodal competition sufficiently established to warrant full deregulation of access and retail markets as an option in the medium term.
A second main result of our models refers to the impact product differentiation has on margin squeeze and foreclosure on part of the entrants. As we model consumers' demand as exhibiting 'love of variety', the entrants aredespite being exposed to a margin squeeze in some situations -never foreclosed. Since they bring additional demand, they are valuable for the incumbent, who can appropriate the additional surplus. The service-based entrants might ensure that customers stay on the incumbent's platform rather than switch to intermodal competitors. Additionally, many effects extend also to the limiting case where the entrant is not differentiated from the incumbent (see Briglauer et al.) , although the entrant is then always foreclosed if there is a margin squeeze in this setting.
A simplification we applied was that the incumbent takes the utility provided by the outside opportunities as given. Modelling the strategic interactions between the different market segments (e.g. mobile vs. wireline) in a framework building on Laffont et al. or Biglaiser and DeGraba would definitely be a task for further research.
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Appendix: Regulatory background
The EU regulatory framework for electronic communications markets 15 requires NRAs to periodically analyse the state of competition on a certain number of
